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ABSTRACT 
 
TABITHA ELIZABETH WALKER: The Distrust Paradox: Trust and Distrust in the Polish 
Online Press, Cross-National Data Reports and Public Opinion Surveys, 2002-2008            
(under the direction of Jacqueline M. Olich) 
 
Poland’s overall economic, political and social situation is improving. However, in the 
realm of trust, the Polish press may be judging their countrymen and women too harshly. I argue 
that there is a disconnect between contemporary popular Polish press articles highlighting the 
extremely distrustful nature of Polish society and the cross-national data which prove that Poles 
are “in the middle of the pack” in comparison to other Eastern European countries when it comes 
to social trust. This disconnect, which I call the “distrust paradox,” is revealed in this study by 
comparing online media and data sources. This “distrust paradox” is not present in the academic 
discourse on Poland and other transitioning societies. Poland’s turbulent history accounts for a 
low level of trust in government, institutions, and other citizens, by Western standards. The press 
articles may be exaggerated, since optimism, societal trust, and general life satisfaction are all on 
the rise.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Trust is a blessing. As an ideal that leads us to believe that people who are 
different from us are part of our moral community, trust makes us more willing 
to deal with people who are different from ourselves and holds us to high 
standards of honesty and fairness.”1 
 
 “Listen, that’s not true. Don’t trust anybody. It’s Poland. You can’t trust anybody.”2 This 
was the response I received from an embassy employee when I inquired about a work permit and 
visa to teach English in Poland. I already had the job; now it was time to tackle the “red tape” of 
acquiring the necessary paperwork. The embassy employee’s warning – “Don’t trust anybody” – 
would stay with me throughout my time in Poland. The embassy employee was not the only one 
who claimed that Poland is a place where people are distrustful and where trust is perceived as a 
flaw instead of a virtue. In Poland, lack of trust has been and is a popular topic in society, the 
press and academia. Readers of Polish magazines and newspapers (both online and in print) 
frequently encounter articles labeling Poland as distrustful and cynical, a country in which 
people envy their neighbors and always try to get ahead at the expense of others.  
 Trust – in its many forms – facilitates mutual confidence and relationships between 
people and their governmental, legal, and law enforcement institutions. On a worldwide scale, 
trust between countries promotes a more peaceful environment for us all. Polish sociologist Piotr 
Sztompka defines trust as “the conviction that others – other people, institutions – will fulfill our 
                                                          
1
 Uslaner, Eric M. and Badescu, Gabriel (2004). “Honesty, Trust and Legal Norms in the Transition to Democracy: 
Why Bo Rothstein is Better Able to Explain Sweden than Romania,” in János Kornai, Bo Rothstein, Susan Rose-
Ackerman (eds.) Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
2
 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Polish to English are my own. 
2 
 
expectations [and] meet their obligations.”3 Trusting others enables us to “put greater confidence 
in other people’s promises that they mean what they say,” writes political scientist Eric M. 
Uslaner.4 Russell Hardin, a political scientist and mathematician, adds, “Trust involves giving 
discretion to another to affect one’s interests.”5 Trust in others to fulfill promises, expectations 
and obligations is crucial to the functioning of any society. Increasing levels of trust – in the 
government and among citizens themselves – is necessary for the development of democracy and 
society in transitioning Eastern European countries, such as Poland. 
Years after Poland joined the European Union in 2004, various internet journals continue 
to report that Poland is the most distrustful country in Europe and portray a quite negative image 
of society. The prevailing distrustful and cynical images people have of themselves could 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. A contradiction between Poles’ perceptions and reality arises 
when we more closely probe cross-national data on trust levels in societies throughout Europe, 
especially Eastern Europe.6 The data indicate that trust levels in Poland do not vary widely from 
those observed in countries such as Ukraine, Czech Republic and Russia. Indeed, data for Poland 
were similar to those for Germany and Spain.  Yet according to the Polish online press, Poland 
has the highest levels of distrust in Europe due to its unique history and Communist legacy.  
                                                          
3
 Sztompka, Piotr (25 October 2008). “Odbudować pyramidę.” Polityka, number 43 (2677), 
http://www.polityka.pl/archive/do/registry/secure/showArticle?id=3360908, accessed 10 March 2009. 
 
4
 Uslaner, Eric M. “Trust as a Moral Value,” in Castiglione, Dario, van Deth, Jan W. and Wolleb, Guglielmo (eds.) 
(2008). The Handbook of Social Capital. New York: Oxford University Press, 101. For more definitions of trust, see 
Niklas Luhmann (1979). Trust and Power. Chichester, England: Wiley Press; Bernard Barber (1983). The Logic and 
Limits of Trust. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
 
5
 Hardin, Russell (1993). “The Street Level Epistemiology of Trust.” Politics and Society 21:4, 507. 
 
6
 I consider “Eastern Europe” to consist of fifteen countries: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Ukraine. Russia is a special case since it is located in both Europe and Asia. For cross-national data, see 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/799/global-social-trust-crime-corruption and the World Values Survey.  
3 
 
What are the origins of this distrust paradox? Why, when multi-country data show that 
while Poland may be a relatively distrustful country, it is by no means exceptional in its level of 
trust? In other words, why is the lack of trust portrayed as a serious moral or societal problem in 
the Polish online press, while cross-national research shows that other countries in the region 
have similarly low levels of trust? What are the reasons Poles give as to why their society is so 
distrustful? What is the academic discourse about trust in Poland? These are some of the 
questions that this paper will address. This study attempts to shed light on the prevalence of the 
trust issue in Polish society and the online press and compare that with the cross-national data on 
trust. 
Hypothesis 
By Western standards, Poles exhibit a relatively low level of trust. In this study, I intend 
to explore the apparent disconnect between Poles’ self-image as reflected in online and print 
journals and the data which indicate that they are not extremely distrustful, but rather “in the 
middle of the pack” in comparison to Eastern European and even with some Western European 
countries. Here, we see a difference between the media’s perception of the problem of trust, and 
the problem itself. I also offer several possible explanations as to why trust seems to be a 
preoccupation in the media.  
An understanding of this distrust paradox offers insights into Polish society. 7 First, we 
see that despite all that Poland has achieved since 1989, the country is still coping with the 
humiliations and oppressions of the past. Distrust in Poland is a result of many factors, many of 
which are historical. Popular discourse and public opinion polls offer an example of how some 
                                                          
7
 For the purposes of this paper, I will focus primarily on social trust, but the data and articles used in this research 
also examine trust in federal and local governments, the judicial system, NGOs, charities, the Catholic Church, and 
law enforcement agencies. 
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Poles are expressing views about their country’s past and future. Secondly, while the media may 
paint a grim picture of Polish society, Poles are becoming more trusting and more satisfied with 
their lives. Thirdly, examining trust levels in Polish society can help future researchers explore 
the same phenomenon in other Eastern European countries. 
A Note on Sources 
The sources used for this study include reports by Polish and international organizations 
and articles in online Polish newspapers and magazines. The Public Opinion Research Center 
(Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, CBOS), established in 1982, is one of the largest and most 
renowned centers for public opinion research in Poland. Public opinion research became popular 
in Poland after 1956, when academics sought to analyze the advantages of de-Stalinization by 
reporting what the public “really” thought.8 Their data reports are currently used by the local and 
federal government, the media, universities and advertising agencies.9  
The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press is an independent public opinion 
research institution in the United States. It studies public attitudes toward politics, the press, and 
public policy. The Center’s research is frequently used by politicians, researchers, students, 
journalists, and citizens. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, part of the Pew Research Center, also 
conducts public opinion surveys, but in an international context. The surveys, conducted in fifty-
five countries so far, range from views about respondents’ personal lives to the current state of 
the world. Established in 2001 in Washington, D.C., it has released twenty-three major reports as 
well as several other papers on American foreign policy, terrorism and globalization.10 
                                                          
8
 Tworzecki, Hubert (2003). Learning to Choose: Electoral Politics in East-Central Europe. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 78. 
 
9
 To explore CBOS, visit their website (in Polish and English): www.cbos.pl. 
 
10
 For more information, see http://people-press.org/ and http://pewglobal.org/. 
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The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is another resource 
cited in this study. The OSCE, the world’s largest regional security organization, includes fifty-
six member states in Europe, Central Asia and North America. Its tasks, among others, include: 
conflict prevention, crisis management, education, border control, arms management and 
democratization. As part of the organization’s democratization activities, the OSCE observes and 
publishes reports before and after elections in countries. The Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR), established in 1991 and based in Warsaw, Poland, is one of the 
offices within the OSCE which monitors and reports on elections.11 
For this paper, I primarily draw information from three online newspapers and 
magazines. Gazeta Wyborcza (Election Gazette), with a circulation of 600,000, was the first 
independently published daily paper in Poland. It is a national newspaper with regional elements, 
covering not only national issues, but local events as well. The first edition was released in May 
of 1989 just before Poland’s first democratic elections. Adam Michnik, the editor-in-chief of 
Gazeta Wyborcza since its inception, is a renowned Polish activist and intellectual. Polityka 
(Politics) is Poland’s oldest weekly current affairs magazine, and is political and social in nature. 
The first edition of Polityka came out in 1957. Despite the magazine’s writings against the party 
line, it successfully navigated the Communist period.12 Today, its circulation ranges from 
260,000 to 300,000. Wprost (Direct), another serious political and social magazine, has been in 
                                                          
11
 Visit the websites of the OSCE (http://www.osce.org/) and ODIHR (http://www.osce.org/odihr/) to learn more. 
 
12
 For a history of Polityka, see 
http://www.polityka.pl/polityka/index.jsp?place=Lead30&news_cat_id=1398&news_id=210806&layout=16&forum
_id=8504&fpage=Threads&page=text. 
 
6 
 
print since 1982. Politicians, economists and lawyers often contribute articles to this weekly 
magazine. It has a circulation of about 300,000.13  
Plan of the Paper 
This thesis contains six chapters. In this first chapter, I describe a paradoxical 
phenomenon emerges in which the Polish online media describes Polish society as extremely 
distrusting, while cross-national data indicate that trust levels in Poland are “in the middle of the 
pack” when compared to results for other countries in the region. I also provide an overview of 
the main sources used in the study. 
In chapter two, we explore the historical reasons Poles say they lack trust. I outline 
several historical events – some predating Communism – which cultivated an environment of 
suspicion and distrust, especially of outside authorities. We also notice another disconnect – 
between the media and popular discourse which portrays Poles as the victims of history and the 
counternarrative highlighting an ability to proactively mobilize, notably during the rise of 
Solidarity. Chapter three addresses the question of whether or not Poles are truly less trusting 
than others. Analysis of several surveys and data sets, notably the Pew Research Center Project 
and CBOS surveys, will show that results for Poland are comparable to those in the rest of 
Eastern Europe and that trust levels have increased since 2002.  
Chapter four examines popular and academic writing about distrusting Poles. Do the 
stories from online Polish newspapers and magazines take both sides, or do they all claim that 
Poles are distrusting? What is the discourse among Polish academics about the lack of trust in 
Polish society? In the fifth chapter, I offer explanations as to why trust is such a significant topic 
                                                          
13
 For more information on the individual Polish daily and weekly newspapers and magazines, see 
www.poland.gov.pl. 
 
7 
 
in the online media. A discussion of implications of the distrust paradox and possible areas for 
future studies follow in chapter six. 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
“We must remind ourselves that, since the eighteenth century, Poles have 
tended to see themselves as a martyr nation, occupied, humiliated, and 
oppressed by aggressive imperial powers. Many times in modern history, 
whether under Russian or other foreign rule, it was a punishable offense for a 
Pole to refer to his own country as Poland.”14 
 
“I don’t know of any other nation that has suffered as much as we have. It’s hard for us 
[Poles] because our country didn’t exist for more than a century,” a Polish friend, Magda, told 
me. “We are not trusting people because our country was partitioned, the Russians and Germans 
occupied Poland.”15 Given many of the events in Polish history, it is easy to see her point; it is 
necessary to note, however, that the Polish ruling class was already fragmented at the time of the 
partitions, and that the Polish state was severely weak even before German invasion or Soviet 
occupation. While a preoccupation with history may seem odd to Westerners or those not 
familiar with Polish culture, it is essential to understanding the discourse on trust in Poland 
today.  
“In the Second Republic, Poles lived with a captivity complex which overlaps with the 
myth of the conquerors of the Red Army. Realism maintained that we should fear our stronger 
neighbors – the Germans as well as the Bolsheviks,” writes Stanisław Janecki in Wprost.16 The 
Polish media and Poles themselves often cite their country’s tumultuous historical experiences 
                                                          
14
 Deak, Istvan (31 May 2001). “Heroes and Victims,” New York Review of Books, 48:9. 
 
15
 Knap, Magda (2007). Private Conversation, Mikołajki, Poland. I have changed this person’s name to protect her 
identity. 
 
16
 Janecki, Stanisław (2000). “Polski Kompleks.” Wprost, http://www.wprost.pl/ar/1237/POLSKI-KOMPLEKS, 
accessed 21 November 2008. 
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when explaining the lack of trust in their society. However, when we examine Polish trust as 
related to history, we notice yet another disconnect. Media discourse and my conversations with 
many Poles evoke a sense of victimization by outside forces throughout history. However, we 
also see a counternarrative in Polish history – one of opposition, resistance, and uprising. 
Contradictory versions of Polish history abound; accepting and integrating competing historical 
narratives lays the foundation for societal trust by reconciling with the past. 
Indeed, Poland’s history of partitions, foreign occupation and Communism does 
contribute to a general mistrust and fear of other countries, and even of other people. “At present, 
Polish [inferiority] complexes are kept in silence, but at least they are justified – by the 
partitions, the wiping out of the intelligentsia during World War II and the Stalinist era,” writes 
journalist Stanisław Janecki in Wprost. He clearly views past historical events as one of the 
reasons for Poles’ (apparently) dissatisfied and distrustful nature. He goes on to cite Communism 
as the main culprit: “The basis for Polish [inferiority] complexes is that fifty years of 
civilizational progress [during Communism] was taken away from us.” 17 There seems to be an 
oversimplification of history exhibited by the media and by ordinary people; in reality, Polish 
history is much more complex.18  
The Partitions of Poland: 1772, 1793, 1795 
In the 18th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth went from being one of the 
most progressive countries in Europe to being divided between Prussia, Russia, and Austria – 
                                                          
17
 Janecki, Stanisław. “Polski Kompleks.” Wprost, http://www.wprost.pl/ar/1237/POLSKI-KOMPLEKS, accessed 
21 November 2008. 
 
18
 To explore this complexity in depth, see Davies, Norman (2005). God’s Playground. A History of Poland in Two 
Volumes.  New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
10 
 
three times. In 1795 Poland disappeared off the map and ceased to exist until 1914.19 Poor 
foreign policy as well as ongoing rivalries between the ruling classes weakened the 
Commonwealth, enabling Poland’s more powerful neighbors to gain more influence in her 
affairs. The Russians in particular wielded considerable influence. 
The Russians’ increasing presence in Poland was a concern to rulers of the other powers 
in the region. Frederick II of Prussia, worried that the Russians might attempt to seize control of 
Poland, proposed that Russia, Prussia and Austria divide parts of Poland among themselves. In 
the first partition (1772), Poland’s size was reduced by almost one third. After the Polish 
Constitution was ratified on 3 May 1791,20 Russia and Prussia were so concerned about Polish 
“rebellion” that they once again agreed to partition Poland a second time in 1793, diminishing 
Poland’s size by 300,000 square kilometers – more than the size of Italy today.21   
Two years later in 1795, the three partitioning powers agreed to divide what was left of 
Poland among them, and the country ceased to exist. In each case, Poles living in the areas 
claimed by the partitioning powers were pressured to assimilate into the culture of the ruling 
country, and were prohibited from exercising any type of national pride. This greatly contributed 
to resentment and fear, especially of Germany and Russia. The extent to which Poland’s internal 
weaknesses at the time of the partitions played a role in her demise is open to debate, but the 
partitions, even today, are an emotional point of discussion for most Poles. 
 
 
                                                          
19
 For a complete history of the Polish partitions, see Łukowski, Jerzy (1999). The Partitions of Poland. London: 
Longman Press. 
20
 Biskupski, M.B. (2000). The History of Poland. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 18. 
 
21
 Ibid. 
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The Jedwabne Controversy 
Historian Jan Gross’s book Sąsiedzi (Neighbors) sparked a heated and often painful 
debate in Poland about national identity, forgiveness and trust. In his book, he argues that many 
of the atrocities against the Jews were perpetrated not only by the Germans, but by Poles as well. 
In Jedwabne, almost the entire Jewish population was murdered, allegedly without the presence 
of any German forces. His conclusion that “half of the population of a small East European town 
murdered the other half” was shocking to most Poles, who tend to view themselves as victims of 
the war.22 While Poles did indeed suffer both at the hands of the Nazis and the Soviets, a 
deviation from this historical narrative – the murders of Jedwabne – challenges the previously 
held notion that Poles were not involved in atrocities against non-Poles. 
The discussion which followed the publication of Sąsiedzi and his latest book, Fear,23 has 
created a division between those who seek reconciliation for the past, and those who may not be 
prepared to accept the actions of some Poles toward their Jewish neighbors. It is still difficult for 
many to come to terms with the possibility that Poles could be victimizers as well as victims. In a 
Polityka article in 2001, Helga Hirsch, a German journalist, recounted a statement she heard 
from a seventy-year-old Pole. “We were taught as children that we Poles never harmed anyone. 
A partial abandonment of this morally comfortable position is very, very difficult for me.”24 The 
                                                          
22
 Gross, Jan (2000). Sąsiedzi: Historia zagłady Ŝydowskiego miasteczka. Sejny, Poland: Fundacja Pograniczne. 
 
23
 Fear examines the presence of Anti-Semitism after the Second World War in Poland. According to Gross, Jews 
who returned to Poland after the war encountered extreme hostility by the Polish population; the Kielce pogrom, in 
which over forty Jews were killed, occurred one year after the end of the war. For more information on the Kielce 
pogrom, see the European Jewish Press, “Poland Marks 60th Anniversary of Kielce Pogrom Against the Jews,” 
http://www.ejpress.org/article/news/9420, and Szajnok, Bozena, “The Kielce Pogrom,” 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Kielce.html, accessed 3 April 2009. 
 
24
 Polonsky, Antony and Michlic, Joanna (2004). The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the Jedwabne 
Massacre in Poland. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1. 
12 
 
revelation of crimes committed by Poles instead of against Poles may lead many to question – or 
even distrust – the manner in which Polish history is presented.25   
Reconciliation not only with the Jews, but also with Poland’s neighbors to the East, has 
been successful. The improvement of relations among Poles, Germans, Ukrainians and Jews is 
indicative of gradually increasing trust and respect between the various groups. In 2001, 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the president of Poland at the time, officially apologized for the 
crimes at Jedwabne: “I apologize in the name of those Poles whose conscience is moved by that 
crime. In the name of those who believe that we cannot be proud of Polish history without at the 
same time feeling pain and shame for the wrongs that Poles have done to others.”26 Indeed, the 
acknowledgement of the past will not only help Poles revise and reassess their national memory, 
it will also facilitate the regaining of trust between Poles and Jews.  
The Rise of Communism, Resistance and Transition 
The three allied conferences at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam ultimately decided that 
Poland would be part of the Soviet sphere of influence. The most severe blows to Polish 
independence occurred during the last two conferences. At Yalta in February 1945, American 
and British leaders made feeble efforts to reassert their influence in Eastern Europe. They 
insisted that representatives of the supporters of the government-in-exile be included in the 
Warsaw government, although the Soviet Union had already recognized the Provisional 
                                                          
25
 To read about the debate surrounding Jan Gross’s book, see Holc, Janine (Autumn, 2002). “Working Through Jan 
Gross’s ‘Neighbors,’ Slavic Review 61:3, 453-459. 
 
26
 Kwaśniewski, Aleksander (2001). “Address by President of Poland Aleksander  Kwaśniewski at the Ceremonies 
in Jedwabne Marking the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Jedwabne Tragedy on 10 July 2001,” in Polonsky, Antony and 
Michlic, Joanna (2004) (eds.). The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 131-132. 
13 
 
Government of the Polish Republic (RTRP).27 At Potsdam in the summer of 1945, Poland’s fate 
was sealed. ‘The Big Three’ consulted with a Soviet-constructed Polish Communist delegation, 
after which they fixed the Polish border with Germany and approved the expulsion of Germans 
from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. A statement by a Polish historian sums up the 
feeling of resentment toward the West as a result: 
The war which Britain began in defense of Poland ended in her abandonment. The 
democracy which the United States claimed to be defending was not protected in 
Warsaw. Poland gave the Western powers a bad conscience and, as a result, was 
marginalized even before the conflict had ended. American war propaganda rarely 
mentioned Poland…Roosevelt’s lack of interest in protecting Poland reflected well-
established American traditions.28 
 
 The feeling of abandonment by the West occasionally resurfaces in Polish politics, even 
to this day. The 2008 Russia-Georgia crisis raised questions among Polish politicians about the 
missile defense shield agreement Poland signed with the United States in August of that year. 
Poles wondered if American influence in Polish military defense would protect Poland or 
antagonize Russia. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski stated that despite signing an 
agreement with the United States, Poland must still exact caution. “Parchments and treaties are 
all very well, but we have a history in Poland of fighting alone and being left to our own devices 
by our allies.” He added that during the Second World War, despite alliances with Britain and 
France, Poland had to fight Nazi Germany alone, and lost. “Then we were stabbed in the back by 
the Soviet Union, and that determined our fate for fifty years,” Sikorski said.29 However, Poland 
maintains close relations with the United States and is actively involved in the EU and NATO, 
                                                          
27
 Davies, Norman (2005). God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Volume II.  New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 364. 
 
28
 Biskupski, M.B. (2000). The History of Poland. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 119. 
 
29
 Kulish, Nicholas (21 August 2008). “Georgian Crisis Brings Attitude Change to a Flush Poland,” New York Times 
Online, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/21/world/europe/21poland.html?_r=1, accessed 17 March 2009. 
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despite the West’s past treatment of Poland. This demonstrates Poland’s willingness to 
cooperate, forgive, and trust. 
For some Poles, Communism was not organically Polish; it was a foreign product, 
imposed on them by the Soviet Union. These sentiments greatly decreased the legitimacy of and 
trust in the new regime, given their past history with Russia. As the Second World War drew to a 
close and the Soviets occupied Poland, there was a rapid succession of governments which 
eventually led to a one-party state, modeled after the Soviet Union. Ultimately, a “free” election 
in January 1947 the Communist-led Democratic Bloc, sponsored by the Soviet Union, received 
80% of the vote.30 In time, the premier, Józef Cyrankiewicz, would transform Poland from a 
pseudo-democracy into a Soviet-style, one-party state. In 1948, Cyrankiewicz traveled to 
Moscow and was instructed to construct a single, ruling party by combining his own Polish 
Socialist Party with the Communist PPR (Polish Workers’ Party). The PPR did not enjoy great 
popularity among the people and was lacking in significant achievements.31  
The counternarrative begins with the rise of Solidarity in the 1980s, which indicates that 
Poles can trust each other enough to mobilize politically to bring about political and social 
change and are not always “victims of history” as the media and popular discourse may claim. In 
the 1980s, Poland’s economy was quickly deteriorating, and price increases led to mass strikes 
by factory workers, tradesmen, and miners. The strikes were preceded by the visit of Pope John 
Paul II to Poland in 1979, which had a profound effect on Poles’ national psyche. His visit 
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confirmed the “enormous capacity for ‘self-organization’ of Polish society.”32 Poles’ ability for 
mass mobilization would contribute greatly to the success of the Solidarity movement. 
The strikes quickly spread throughout Poland, with a focal point in the port city of 
Gdańsk. Lech Wałęsa, an electrician who was among those fired by authorities for protesting, 
became the leader of the Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS), later dubbed Solidarity 
(Solidarność). Solidarity also had the support of the intellectuals of the opposition, as well as the 
Catholic Church, and felt the cohesion of their organization was a stark contrast to the 
factionalism which had spread throughout the Communist regime.33 Solidarity was unique in that 
it managed to bring together Poles from various socioeconomic groups and foster trust between 
them. 
The two main successes of Solidarity, in brief, were the ability to mass mobilize the 
Polish population and then forcing the regime to make various concessions up until the Round 
Table of February 1989. At its peak, Solidarity boasted nearly 10 million members – roughly 
one-third of the entire Polish population.34 Despite being forced underground during martial law 
in the early 1980s, Solidarity was able to maintain wide public support. Poles from all walks of 
life, from housewives and students to intellectuals and peasants, united with the shipyard 
workers at the forefront.  
The enormous amount of mobilization required by Poles for Solidarity to achieve such 
membership is a strong indicator of mutual trust. The dire economic situation and the 
incompetence of the ruling party, combined with the government’s foolish decision to increase 
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prices, was enough to overcome any previous divisions in the society. By working together, 
Solidarity’s large number of members wielded enough leverage to bring about considerable 
changes in the government.  
During the rise of Solidarity, we also notice a shift in Poles’ position in history. No 
longer were they the victims of a dominant force with no power to change the situation. They 
were a proactive force, challenging the regime. The Round Table negotiations led to the election 
of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first non-Communist prime minister in the Eastern Bloc. Wałęsa 
temporarily abstained from taking any type of public office. However, he won the presidential 
election in 1990, and continues to enjoy high levels of social trust in Poland today, almost twenty 
years later.35 
After the transition, Poles faced a difficult decade as they adjusted to the numerous 
changes in the government and economic sectors. The rapid changes in the 1990s also led to low 
levels of trust in Poland.36 Fortunately, Poles’ life situation slowly began to improve in the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. In 2008, over half of Poles surveyed (54%) stated that they 
were sure their lives were progressing well, and 55% stated that they felt that they had some 
measure of success in life.37 These feelings indicate that Poles trust in not only the present, but 
the future state of their lives. My interviews corroborate these findings. Joanna Nowak, who 
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came of age during and after the Second World War, was generally satisfied with the present 
situation in Poland:  
Young people these days complain too much about Poland…they don’t know what bad 
means! World War II, German and then Soviet occupation – now that’s bad, my dear!  I 
remember the war, the German soldiers…horrible! Then the Russians came – it was 
worse! One of them [a Russian soldier] tried to carry me off when I was a young girl. If a 
woman hadn’t threatened to fetch her husband, I don’t know what might have happened 
to me! And then komuna [Polish term for Communist period]…now it’s much better, 
we’re free, there’s no war.38  
 
When I asked her if I could use our conversation for research purposes, she was 
enthusiastic, but asked me to change her name because she was afraid that the Germans or 
Russians might come after her. Her request illustrates the continuous and ever-present fears of 
Germany and Russia, two countries which have behaved aggressively toward Poland in the past. 
For her, the Communist system was an extension of Soviet occupation. 
People had many aspirations for democracy and capitalism. The government and 
economy would be transformed by shock therapy, and the transition would be quick and 
painless. Democracy would restore Poland’s legacy of independence. Capitalism would bring 
economic prosperity, jobs, and financial security. Piotr Sztompka, a Polish sociologist, 
summarizes this feeling well with this statement: “All that socialism promised, but never 
delivered, was to be realized now, in a free, democratic order.”39 When those in power failed to 
live up to these expectations, people became disillusioned and cynical with politicians, 
exacerbating the syndrome of distrust in authority.  
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Conclusion 
 Poles can point to many historical reasons not to trust those in power. Even before 
Communism, the partitions and the Allies’ treatment of Poland groomed them to be wary of 
outside powers. The three partitioning powers decided what would happen to Poland in the 
eighteenth century, leaving the Poles out of the decision-making process. Russian, Austrian or 
Prussian state structures were “perceived as something alien, imposed from the outside, and 
designed to serve the interests of outsiders.”40 This feeling resurfaced during the rise of 
Communism, but the Solidarity movement, empowered by Polish Pope John Paul II, heightened 
awareness for human rights and national sovereignty, providing the Poles with a source of 
authority other than the Communist regime.  
 This section has provided a brief overview of some events in Polish history which may 
have contributed an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion. The Solidarity movement and other 
uprisings show a slight disparity between the popular and media discourse which stress the 
victimization of Poles and the ability of Solidarity to mobilize a third of the population to 
proactively transform Poland’s government. Painful memories continue to surface as Poles come 
to terms with their past treatment of Jews and ethnic minorities. Recent efforts on the part of the 
Poles and their neighbors are indicative of the initial stages of reconciliation, resulting in a 
gradual restoration of trust.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
ARE POLES LESS TRUSTING THAN OTHERS? 
 
“Would you like to visit me in Gdańsk some time? I have a daughter about your 
age. I’m sure she would love to meet you. And I would love to show you my city, 
too.”41 
 
This section will examine the cross-national data from an April 2008 Pew Research 
project and CBOS public opinion poll from February 2008, showing levels of social trust over 
time from 2002 to 2008. The Pew Research Global Attitudes Project shows that while levels of 
trust in some Eastern European countries – notably Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine – have 
decreased significantly, Poland’s trust levels, in contrast, have changed the least and remained 
constant. The CBOS poll measures social trust over the past six years. Though it may come as a 
surprise to consumers of online and print popular media, Polish society is slowly becoming more 
trusting. 
Pew Research Study on Trust Levels in Forty-Seven Countries 
Out of the forty-seven countries involved in the Pew Research study, the Chinese and the 
Swedes were the most trusting (at 79% and 78%, respectively, agreeing with the statement “Most 
people in society are trustworthy.”) The most distrustful countries were Kenya and Kuwait, with 
only 25% and 27% agreeing with the same statement.42 The Pew Research report demonstrated 
that where social trust is high, crime and corruption are low. There were six Eastern European 
                                                          
41
 Jaworska, Zofia (2006). Private conversation, Poznań, Poland. I received this invitation from her a short time after 
having met her on a train. 
42
 Wike, Richard and Holzwart, Kathleen. “Where Trust is High, Crime and Corruption are Low.” 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/799/global-social-trust-crime-corruption, accessed 5 December 2008. 
 
20 
 
countries in the study.43 As expected, in Eastern Europe, the dramatic changes brought about by 
the democratic transitions caused a decrease in the number of trusting people in Russia, Bulgaria 
and Ukraine. 
While the popular press repeatedly characterizes Polish society and people as “the most 
distrusting in Europe,” the cross-national data show that Poland is more accurately “in the 
middle of the pack.”44 To find out whether Poland is a distrustful country on a larger scale, we 
should compare Poland to other countries in the region. The disconnect between the rather 
critical nature of the Polish media toward their society emerges when we look at the results for 
the six Eastern European nations. Russia appears to be the most trusting; half of respondents 
(50%) reported that most people can be trusted. Poland fares well in comparison to Bulgaria, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Ukraine came in at a close second with 47%. The Czech 
Republic had the lowest number of trusting people (42%), therefore contradicting the claim 
which has been made so often in Polish media about Poles being “the most distrusting in 
Europe.” Surprisingly, the most distrustful people are not in Eastern Europe but in Italy, where 
just 41% of respondents report that they trust others. 
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TABLE 3.1. Responses to the Statement “Most People in Society are Trustworthy.” Source: Pew Research Project, 
“Where Trust is High, Crime and Corruption are Low,” http://pewresearch.org/pubs/799/global-social-trust-crime-
corruption. 
 
 
  
Indeed, when we compare Poland with Western European countries, we find that their 
results do not vary significantly. With 48 percent of trusting people in Poland, Poles scored 
higher than France and Spain (45 and 43%). Poles, according to the study, are only 8% less 
trusting than the Germans (56%).  
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TABLE 3.2. Responses to the Statement “Most People in Society are Trustworthy” in Poland Compared with the 
United States and Five Western European Countries. Source: Pew Research Project, “Where Trust is High, Crime 
and Corruption are Low,” http://pewresearch.org/pubs/799/global-social-trust-crime-corruption 
 
 
 
CBOS Report on Trust Levels in Poland, 2002-2008 
The CBOS poll from February 2008 shows lower results for Poland than the Pew study, 
but it also indicates a significant decrease in the number of people who distrust. The number of 
people who agreed with the statement “In relations with others, one must be very careful” 
decreased from 79% in 2002 to 72% in 2008. Mutual trust among Poles is slowly increasing. 
Only 38% of Poles claimed that they trust other people, up from 33% in 2006.45 The number of 
people stating “Generally, the majority of people can be trusted” increased from 19% in 2002 to 
26% in 2008. Not only are Poles becoming more trusting toward other people, they are also 
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trusting public institutions in larger numbers. The poll asked participants to rate their trust in 
several institutions. For the purposes of this paper, five institutions will be included in Table 1.4: 
the Sejm/Senate, courts, local authorities, the European Union and the police. The results show a 
positive increase in the past six years. 
TABLE 3.3. Trust Levels in Five Institutions in Poland in 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. Source: Wciórka, Bogna. 
CBOS opinion poll (February 2008). “Zaufanie społeczne w latach 2002-2008.” 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2008/K_030_08.PDF. 
 
 
 
One can notice from the chart above that in 2004, trust levels in all five institutions were 
lower than in the previous and subsequent years. Poland’s accession to the EU occurred in 2004. 
Amid the changes in the infrastructures of Polish economy, politics and society resulting from 
EU membership, the Polish public may have felt overwhelmed and even suspicious, accounting 
for the drop in trust levels. 
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From the CBOS data, we see favorable results to support the claim that trust in public 
institutions is on the rise in Poland:  
• Trust in local government increased from 43% to 68% 
• Trust in the EU increased from 49% to 73% 
• Trust in the police increased from 62% to 75% 
• Trust in the courts increased from 40% to 59% 
• Trust in the federal government increased from 42% to 56%46 
The data suggest that the media’s allegations of distrust in Poland may be overstated. 
Despite the higher levels of trust in these five institutions, it is necessary to note that most Poles 
still do not trust political parties – a little over half (54%) do not trust them (down from 65% in 
2002 and significantly less than the 72% in 2004).47 The Communist legacy, the lack of party 
diversity, and the public perception that parties do not properly represent them are all possible 
explanations. However, as we will see later, there is a difference between trust in political parties 
and trust in the political process. 
The CBOS poll concludes that levels of social trust are slowly increasing and that trust in 
the private sphere (family, close friends and neighbors), as always, remains high. According to 
the poll, some institutions and people continue to enjoy high social trust. Traditionally, the 
immediate family and relatives have always been the most trusted (99% and 90% respectively 
declare trust).48 Among other trusted groups are friends (88%) and co-workers (76%). The 
number of people declaring distrust toward strangers and the majority of society also decreased. 
Distrust toward the majority of society fell from 11% in 2006 to 7% in 2008, and the number of 
those who expressed moderate distrust toward strangers fell from 43% to 38%. The number of 
individuals who believe the majority of people can be trusted rose from 19% in 2006 to 26% in 
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2008. This indicates that Polish society is moving away from mutual suspicion and doubt and 
toward more confidence and trust. Poles, indeed, are not the most distrustful people in Europe. 
Contrary to the media and common discourse about lack of trust in public institutions, 
certain organizations do enjoy high levels of trust. The military (84%) and police (75%), charity 
organizations such as Caritas (80%) are among these organizations. Some international 
organizations also enjoy the trust of the majority of Poles, such as the European Union (73%), 
UN (69%) and NATO (68%). Sixty-eight percent also trust local authorities. Here, we note the 
distinction between the local and the federal government. The local government is trusted more 
by Poles, perhaps because of greater accessibility. It is easier to meet with a city council member 
or mayor, for example, than a parliament member or the prime minister. 
International organizations enjoy greater prestige among Poles, and therefore greater trust 
than domestic institutions. Membership in the EU and NATO distances Poles from their 
Communist bloc past and sets them on the world stage – with the powerful, wealthy Western 
countries to which they previously did not have access. European Union membership grants 
privileges for travel, economic development, work and study. Poland’s EU accession in 2004 
officially marked their crossing over into the European community. NATO may help Poland to 
feel protected from Russia. There is more incentive to trust in the EU than in the Polish 
government. European Union membership promised possibilities for employment and travel, and 
opportunities for in-country development. Most of these promises were fulfilled. Poles are now 
free to work, study or travel in any member country, and there are new roads, educational 
opportunities and study programs supported by EU funds. However, when the Polish government 
makes promises, sometimes those promises are not kept.   
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When the government does not keep its promises, however, Poles are not afraid to 
politically mobilize. The formation of a far-right parliamentary coalition in May of 2006 caused 
a significant decrease in satisfaction in the government, and Poles responded when early 
elections were called in October of 2007, two years ahead of schedule. In the 2007 Polish 
parliamentary elections, widespread dissatisfaction with the existing right-wing coalition sparked 
a significant increase in voter turnout to vote the coalition out of parliament. High voter turnout 
in 2007 is evidence of Poles’ trust in the political process. Voters knew that if enough people 
voted, they had the power to change the nature of the government. 
The 2007 Polish Parliamentary Elections: Trust in the Voting Process Leads to Change 
The 2007 parliamentary elections are another example of how Poles are capable of trust.  
During the 2005 parliamentary elections, many people (disillusioned as usual with politics) did 
not concern themselves with the elections. Voter turnout was at a minimum, with only 40% of 
voters participating.49 When a far-right coalition between the Law and Justice Party and two far-
right wing parties formed in May of 2006,50 Poles reacted – they did not want an extreme right-
wing government. When early elections were held in October 2007, they made their voice 
known. Voter turnout increased from 40% in 2005 to almost 54% in 2007 – the highest voter 
turnout in a parliamentary election in Poland in the post-Communist era.51 
During the PiS-Samoobrona-LPR term, numerous events occurred to cause the public’s 
decrease in trust and satisfaction in the government. A CBOS survey conducted shortly after the 
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coalition formed stated that the low satisfaction ratings for the government were a result of the 
public’s “rather cold reaction to the invitation of representatives of Samoobrona and LPR to the 
coalition.”52 PiS’s leaders had little experience with running the economy and even less 
experience with foreign policy, a major point of concern for many observers. In addition, LPR 
was regarded as anti-EU, and Samoobrona was “euroskeptic,” especially when it came to 
policies which it viewed as disadvantageous for Poland (for example, Samoobrona favored 
renegotiation of the EU accession treaty). LPR was closely affiliated with the racist-nationalist 
youth organization MłodzieŜ Wszechpolska (All-Polish Youth). The PiS government was also 
criticized of acting inappropriately toward governments of other nations and complicating EU 
constitution and electoral procedures. In the summer of 2007, Prime Minister Jarosław 
Kaczyński allegedly made the argument that “Poland should get more votes in European Union 
councils because of Polish population losses at Nazi hands during World War II.”53  
Such events sparked concerns among liberal-minded Poles as well as members of the 
international community. There was fear that an extremist, xenophobic and anti-European trend 
was emerging in Poland. The fact that identical twin brothers possessed the two highest state 
positions and two extremist parties held key roles in the Sejm led to many important questions. 
Did Samoobrona and LPR’s presence in the parliament mean that Poland was going toward 
radical extremism? Would Europe be able to trust Poland? As the leader of the new Eastern 
European EU states, Poland could not afford to take a step back, away from EU integration. 
During the poor performance of the PiS-Samoobrona-LPR coalition, distrust in the three 
politicians leading those parties increased significantly as people were not satisfied with their 
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style of government. Most Poles also did not plan to vote for Roman Giertych, Andrzej Lepper 
or Jarosław Kaczyński again in the 2007 elections. 
TABLE 3.4. Distrust in and Refusal to Vote for the PiS Coalition Leaders in the 2007 Parliamentary Elections. 
Source: http://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2007/K_128_07.PDF and 
http://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2007/K_149_07.PDF. 
 
 
Politician 
 
Distrust (in %) 
 
Refusal to vote for 
this politician in 
2007 (in %) 
 
Roman Giertych (LPR) 
 
66 
 
46 
 
Andrzej Lepper (Samoobrona) 
 
59 
 
55 
 
Jarosław Kaczyński (PiS) 
 
53 
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Donald Tusk, the current Prime Minister of Poland, stated during the 2007 election 
campaign that “Poland cannot afford another 12 months of rows, conflicts, aggression and 
disgracing the country at home and abroad.”54 Most Poles agreed and were supportive of a more 
centrist government, which is indicated by PO’s victory in the elections. The official OSCE 
report of the 2007 parliamentary elections showed that PO received 41.51% of the vote 
(equivalent to 209 seats in the Sejm), while PiS received 32.11% (166 seats).55 Voter backlash – 
fueled by distrust in far-right wing parties – was most severe against the two far right parties of 
the PiS coalition. Neither Samoobrona nor LPR made the 5% mark for gaining seats in the Sejm. 
Samoobrona and LPR received 1.53% and 1.30% of the vote, respectively.56 (In 2005, 
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Samoobrona received 11.41% and LPR 7.97% of the vote.)57 The significant decrease in support 
for the two right-wing parties indicates greater voter dissatisfaction with their performance and 
unwillingness to vote them into positions of power in the new government. 
TABLE 3.5. Election Results for the 2007 Polish Parliamentary Elections. Source: 
http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/W/index.htm. 
 
Party Number of votes Percentage Seats in Sejm 
PO 6,701,010 41.51 209 
PiS 5,183,477 32.11 166 
LiD (Lewica i 
Demokraci)58 
2,122,981 13.15 53 
PSL 1,437,638 8.91 31 
Samoobrona 247,335 1.53 0 
LPR 209,171 1.30 0 
 
The 2007 elections illustrate that Poles trust the democratic process to work, even if they 
historically do not have great trust toward political parties. If Poles thought that voting was 
useless, the voter turnout in the last election would not have been the highest in Poland’s post-
Communist history. As during the Solidarity movement of the 1980s, Poles trust in the “strength 
in numbers” approach when it comes to making necessary changes in the government. In a recent 
CBOS poll, over half of Poles trust current Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and slightly less than 
half support his government.59 
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The Exception That Proves the Rule? 
My supervisor paid me in cash for some extra hours I worked at the English school. I 
went to deposit the money into my bank account, carrying the money in a white envelope which 
I stuffed in my pocket during the short walk to the bank. When I got to the bank, I reached into 
my pocket to get the envelope, only to realize it was gone. The envelope must have fallen out of 
my pocket. For a moment I stood in front of the bank teller, frozen, unable to say anything. The 
envelope contained 500 złoty (at the time, about $163) – a large sum of money for most Poles, 
whose average monthly income is about 800 złoty. At that moment, a middle-aged woman came 
into the bank and walked up to me. She noticed I was searching my pockets. She asked me if I 
had lost something, and I told her I had. 
“What was it?” She asked. I responded that I lost a white envelope which contained some 
money. “Here you go,” she replied, and handed me the envelope.  All the money was still there. I 
was speechless. “Thank you,” I managed to say, and the woman smiled and left. I was still in 
shock and wanted to give her some of the money to thank her. I left the bank to look for her, but 
when I looked outside, she was gone. 
According to the newspaper and online journal articles, such an honest act is nearly 
impossible in Poland. None of my friends could believe it. “I’m surprised she didn’t just take the 
money,” they said. “We are in Poland, you know.” Poles might say their fellow countrymen and 
women are dishonest and cannot be trusted, but given this experience, I am tempted not to be as 
harsh on Poles as they are on themselves. Was that lady the exception that proves the rule, or is it 
the few, dishonest people who are ruining the reputation of Poles, who are generally trustworthy 
and try to do the right thing? 
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Determinants of Trust in Poland: Demographics 
Education level, material situation and religiosity play a role in whether Poles trust 
others, including family members and close friends.  CBOS research indicates that well-
educated, religious Poles living in above average material conditions exhibit the most trust 
toward family members. Poles with low income, workers and pensioners living in small towns 
and in rural areas are among the most distrusting. Trust in acquaintances was also affected by 
one’s financial situation and education level, and distrust in acquaintances was declared most 
frequently by the unemployed, pensioners, and those with financial difficulties.60 Trust in co-
workers depended on the position of the person within the company – the lower the position, the 
more frequent the distrust. Students (aged 18-24) declared the most distrust toward neighbors 
and local parish priests; overall, young people (aged 15-29) declared the highest levels of distrust 
(82.70% according to a World Values Survey) 61. Poles aged 50 and over seemed to be more 
trusting. Slightly over 21% declared “most people can be trusted” compared to 17.30% of 
respondents aged 15-29, and 17.50% of respondents aged 30-49.62 
There did not seem to be a large variation in trust levels between genders. Results from 
the 1999 World Values Survey and the 2006 European Social Survey yielded similar results for 
Polish men and women, with women being slightly more trusting than their male counterparts. 
The World Values Survey asked respondents, “Do you think most people can be trusted, or that 
you cannot be too careful?” Nearly 21% of women and almost 17% of men responded that most 
people can be trusted. Eighty-three percent of men stated that one cannot be too careful in 
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dealing with other people, compared to only 79% of women.63 The European Social Survey 
posed a similar question, but also asked respondents to measure how much they trusted other 
people on a ten-point scale, with zero indicating that “you cannot be too careful” and ten 
indicating “most people can be trusted.” Results show that over 25% of females had a score of 
five, indicating neither a high level of distrust nor a high level of trust. Slightly over 23% of 
males were also at the five-point mark.64  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter we have explored whether cross-national data show that Poles are truly 
less trusting than others. Using the Pew Research study on trust, crime and corruption, we have 
seen that Poland is indeed not the most distrustful country in Europe as some media sources may 
claim. In that study, 48% of Poles surveyed stated that most people could be trusted – three 
points higher than France, five points higher than Spain and seven points higher than Italy, which 
had the lowest score at 41%. Compared within Eastern Europe, Poland is at the forefront of 
trusting societies. 
 The CBOS poll from February 2008 on the trust levels of Poles over a six-year period 
produced quite optimistic trends. It showed not only that social trust is growing, but also that 
trust in various institutions is also increasing. Trust in the European Union, the police, courts, the 
parliament and senate increased from 2004 to 2008. In the past two years, the television industry, 
the press and the military were also among those institutions able to gain more of Poles’ trust. 
While the family remains the most trusted of all social groups, more Poles are declaring that they 
can trust strangers as well. Now almost 40% of Poles share this opinion.   
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 Despite Poland’s turbulent history with politics and politicians, the most recent 
parliamentary elections in Poland show that Poles have trust that the political process will work, 
even if the parties themselves are rather ineffective. When the far-right coalition’s poor foreign 
policy and nationalist rhetoric threatened to damage Poland’s reputation at home and abroad, 
Poles knew that they could replace the coalition with a more centrist and less combative party. 
The voter turnout in that election was the highest since Poland’s transition. Poles may be 
disillusioned with politicians, parties and sometimes with one another, but thanks to 1989, they 
now live in a country where the people not only have the power to choose, but the power to 
change as well. 
Despite the media’s claims, Poles are not the most distrusting people in Europe. Nor is 
the society as paranoid as the media may claim. As illustrated by the quote at the beginning of 
this chapter, Poles are capable of trusting. The invitation to Gdańsk, extended to a foreigner on a 
train, contradicts the media’s arguments that Poles are suspicious, distrustful, and wary of 
outsiders. I eventually accepted Zofia’s invitation, and very much enjoyed my stay in Gdańsk 
and her Polish hospitality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
OVERVIEW OF MEDIA AND ACADEMIC DISCOURSE ON DISTRUSTING POLES 
 
“[The average Pole] does not trust people, institutions, the law, government 
employees, the wealthy, or politicians. Distrust permeates his life and his view 
of human nature.”65 
 
“Our lack of trust shows that something bad happened during the transition 
period, something that did not allow the creation of trust.”66 
 
Media discourse on distrusting Poles is omnipresent. There are frequent articles about 
Poles’ distrusting or cynical behavior, inferiority complex or aggressive nature. The articles do 
little to suggest ways to improve trust levels, and few paint an optimistic picture of Polish 
society. The academic discourse presents an equally dire situation, but often avoids the fatalistic 
tone of the online media. 
The relationship between the media discourse and academic discourse is a close one. The 
authors of the online media articles frequently cite or reference Polish and other sociologists, 
psychologists, historians and political scientists. For example, Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka, 
author of several books and articles on the lack of trust in Poland67, participated in an interview 
with a journalist from Polityka in 2007 and later contributed an article, “Rebuilding the 
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Pyramid,” in October 2008. Psychologist Janusz Grzelak68 of the University of Warsaw also 
participated in an interview for Polityka.  
Media Discourse 
Although the majority of the seventy-six articles consulted for this study described the 
distrust issue in Polish society, there were no suggestions offered to improve the situation. It is 
necessary to note, however, that the goal of the online media articles may not be to find a 
solution to the problem; rather, journalists may want to bring the problem to the attention of the 
readers. Nevertheless, it would be helpful at least to speculate how trust levels could be raised. 
The general attitude of the articles seemed to be, “We’re distrustful, but there’s nothing we can 
do about it.” This can be attributed to what Sztompka calls providentialism – a resignation to fate 
which is a common phenomenon found in post-Communist countries.   
“It is high time that we did something about that [lack of trust], to expose our countrymen 
to others, inspire a spirit of community, end the culture of jealousy and suspicion fueled by 
politicians, especially in the last two years,”69 writes journalist Janusz Czapiński in an article in 
Wprost, “The Republic of the Distrusting.” Yet Czapiński does not actually offer any way to 
achieve this goal. “There are few people in the world as distrusting as Poles,” Jacek śakowski 
states in a Polityka article. “Distrust may be a self-contained ailment of reason or culture…it is a 
trait which makes life more difficult rather than easier.”70 Again, śakowski presents the problem 
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to the reader without providing any possible solutions. Although public opinion polls somewhat 
contradict the media’s claim of severe social distrust (there is a correlation between the increase 
in material comfort and rising trust levels), the general absence of any solution to the problem in 
the media seems to be widespread.  
A Newsweek Polska cover article from October 2006, entitled “Wściekłość Polska” 
(Polish Fury), inspired my research into Polish national identity and trust. This article is critical 
of Polish society. The author, Zygmunt Miłoszewski, is perplexed by the anger, distrust and 
aggression displayed by his fellow Poles, especially given all the positive aspects of the country, 
specifically culture, history, and environment. Miłoszewski writes, “Is it possible that the reason 
for Polish wkurzenia (extremely aggravated nature) is dreadfully low self-esteem?” He goes on 
to explain that in a 2005 report in a monthly magazine called Science about national stereotypes, 
Poles thought of themselves just as poorly and stereotypically as other nations. “We rate 
ourselves the worst out of all nationalities in the study,” 71 Miłoszewski notes sadly.  
After reading the report which Miłoszewski cites, “National Character Does Not Reflect 
Mean Personality Trait Levels in 49 Cultures,” I realized that Miłoszewski misrepresented data 
to make overly negative statements about Polish society. For example, when he writes that Poles 
rated themselves “the worst out of all nationalities in the study,” such data are missing from the 
study. The goal of the study was not to discover which countries had the worst self-image, but to 
compare national character ratings with the results for personality scores assessed by self-reports 
and observer ratings.72  
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The report contains no evidence to support Miłoszewski’s claim that Poles think of 
themselves just as poorly as other nations do. In fact, the study does not address how well or how 
poorly people of different nations think of themselves at all. Rather, the report seeks to find 
correlation between observer and national character ratings, not rank which nationalities think 
poorly of themselves and which ones do not. Poland is briefly mentioned in the study because 
the observer ratings matched the national character and self ratings, but the characteristics which 
matched are not mentioned.73 As far as observer ratings for Poland were concerned, Poland was 
in the group with the highest National Character Survey (NCS) scores for the personality trait 
“neurotic,” although they did not have the highest observer-rating score for the same trait 
(Turkey did). This merely means that Poles’ view of themselves greatly corresponds to outsiders’ 
view of Poles. It does not mean that Poles rate themselves more harshly than other nationalities. 
Not all of the articles were pessimistic, although none explicitly stated that Poles are 
becoming more trusting. In a 2008 Wprost article, “Why We Are Happy,” Sergiusz Sachno and 
Agnieszka Sijka discuss the growing optimism in Poland. The improvement of Poles’ material 
situation is one contributing factor to rising trust levels. Living in difficult times has taught Poles 
how to appreciate the products which were not previously available to them. “In contrast to the 
blasé Germans, French or British, who are accustomed to plasma television sets, video games or 
good musical equipment, Poles are happy about having access to those things now and it is a 
luxury for them.”74 No material possessions could compare to the regaining of freedom, which 
many Poles use to their advantage through travel, study, and intercultural communication. Poles 
are also very enthusiastic about opportunities for personal and professional development. Poles 
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from various generations register for foreign language instruction and are eager to communicate 
with native speakers of English, German, French, or other languages. An increased openness to 
the world indicates a greater trust in others, even those of different national or linguistic 
traditions. 
Technology also played a role in opening up Poles to the world, especially the younger 
generation. “New technologies helped us in getting rid of the barriers which cut us off from the 
rest of Europe,” says Jacek Świderski, co-founder of the Polish internet portal o2.pl. “The young 
generation of Poles does not have any complexes toward people from abroad…the Internet is our 
window to the world, it has taken us out of our homes, encouraged us to travel, and has reached 
over to the growth of economic efficiency.”75 Exposure to other countries and people reduces 
fear of the unknown, therefore facilitating mutual trust. 
Academic Discourse 
Scholars in various disciplines are concerned with trust, including sociologists, 
psychologists, historians, anthropologists and political scientists. For this discussion on academic 
discourse, I provide an overview of work by political scientist Hubert Tworzecki76 and 
sociologist Piotr Sztompka. While Tworzecki’s work focuses on comparative politics, parties 
and elections, some of his research is relevant to my argument. His analysis of civic engagement 
in Poland77 indicates that the increasing disdain Poles show for civic institutions and politics is 
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indicative of high levels of distrust in the society. Trust is the main focus of Sztompka’s 
research, and he most frequently uses Poland as his main case study. 
Lack of Civic and Political Engagement as an Indicator of a Distrustful Society 
 Poles’ lack of trust not only affects their relations with one another, but is also displayed 
in a wider context in civic and political life. Participation in political activities, such as signing 
petitions and contacting officials, is very low.78 Distrust of political parties (54%) and the 
parliament (44%) is still high.79 Tworzecki argues that the main reason for distrust in and 
disillusionment with political parties is the public’s view that the parties “violate the trust placed 
in them as people’s representatives.”80 People vote for parliament members or certain parties, 
and in the end, they do not feel represented or feel that the politicians take voters’ concerns into 
consideration. In fact, only about one in five respondents in Tworzecki’s project felt represented 
by any party, and when they were asked how they would describe most politicians, 77% chose 
‘dishonest.’81 
 Tworzecki notes that despite the large amount of distrust of politicians and political 
parties, there is solid evidence that Poles can mobilize to bring about change. He cites the 
example of the Solidarity movement in Poland. “We know for a fact that in 1980-1981 millions 
of Poles were able to mobilize for political action, create organizational structures, elect 
representatives and so forth,” he writes. Indeed, if in the early 1980s Poles were able to have 
                                                          
78
 Tworzecki provides a good comparison between the political engagement of Poles and twenty-three other 
European countries in his 2008 article, “A Disaffected New Democracy? Identities, institutions and civic 
engagement in post-communist Poland,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 41:1, 60.  
 
79
 Wciórka, Bogna. CBOS opinion poll (February 2008). “Zaufanie społeczne w latach 2002-2008.” 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2008/K_030_08.PDF. 
 
80
 Tworzecki, Hubert (2008). “A Disaffected New Democracy? Identities, institutions and civic engagement in post-
communist Poland,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 41:1, 58. 
 
81
 Ibid. 
 
40 
 
enough trust in the power of the common voice to bring about political change, then there must 
have been some measure of trust in the society. If this is the case, then there is hope for the 
Polish community to revive trust in the future. 
Piotr Sztompka’s Characteristics of a Distrustful Society 
Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka82 focuses on trust in his work on Polish society. Poland 
is used as a case study in his article, “Trust and Emerging Democracy: Lessons from Poland.” 
Here, Sztompka not only diagnoses Poland with a “syndrome of distrust,” but also lists six 
characteristics of a distrustful society. For this paper, four of these are examined: 
providentialism, corruption, ghettoization and externalization. These substitutes for trust help the 
society gain some sense of predictability and orderliness.   
Providentialism is Sztompka’s term meaning a “regression from the discourse of agency 
to a discourse of fate.”83 In other words, supernatural forces such as God or fate are thought to 
influence a situation; nothing can be done about it because the outcome has already been 
determined. The only option is to simply “wait and see.” Sztompka writes that while resigning to 
fate may temporarily alleviate some fear or dread of an uncertain future, in the end it creates 
“disastrous effects – passivity and stagnation.”84 Indeed, this “wait and see” attitude is common 
in Poland, as well as in other Eastern European countries. When faced with an uncertain (or even 
certain) situation, it is common to hear “Zobaczymy” - “We’ll see.” Sztompka describes this as a 
“presentist orientation.” While this is often the case, it is not always true. The rise of Solidarity in 
the 1980s is an example of how Poles did not resign themselves and the future of their country to 
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fate. Furthermore, in the 2007 parliamentary elections, Poles mobilized and arrived at the polls in 
record numbers to vote the far-right coalition out of government. They knew that they could use 
their voice to change a political situation which was not to their liking. 
The second substitute for trust is corruption. As the Pew Research report on trust and 
crime/corruption showed, in countries where social trust is low, concerns about corruption tend 
to be higher and vice versa.85 While Poland’s trust levels were not extremely low, concerns about 
corruption are still relatively high (60%).86 Sztompka claims that corruption provides some sense 
of control in situations where individuals may feel they have no say in what happens. During and 
even after the Communist era, people often gave small gifts to doctors or bosses to ensure 
preferential treatment.87 This implies, for example, that a patient could not trust a doctor with 
providing satisfactory service; only by giving a “gift” could he or she be certain of proper 
medical care at present or in the future.  
Unfortunately, the cessation of corruption in East-Central European politics (including 
Poland) is easier said than done. There are widely reported cases of abuse of power and white 
collar crime among political and administrative elites, therefore increasing levels of public 
distrust in authority. Ministers, mayors and politicians are frequently dismissed on charges of 
corruption. In July of 2007, former pig farmer turned Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of 
Agriculture, Andrzej Lepper, was dismissed after charges that he traded jobs for sexual favors. 
Just last year, there was a scandal involving the mayor in Olsztyn, the town where I lived and 
worked. Mayor Czesław Jerzy Małkowski spent over six months in jail for rape and sexually 
                                                          
85
 Wike, Richard and Holzwart, Kathleen. “Where Trust is High, Crime and Corruption are Low.” 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/799/global-social-trust-crime-corruption, accessed 5 Dec 2008. 
 
86
 While all Eastern European countries included in the Pew Research survey on trust, crime, and corruption, the 
Czech Republic scored the highest for concern about corrupt politicians (78%). 
 
87
 Sztompka, Piotr (March 1996). “Trust and Emerging Democracy: Lessons from Poland.” International Sociology 
1 (11), 45.  
42 
 
harassing female clerks at the Olsztyn city hall. With stories like these, it is no wonder that Poles 
do not trust some politicians. 
Ghettoization refers to the closing off and isolation of a group. This group may seem to 
think it is in a threatening and strange environment. “A diffused distrust in the wider society is 
compensated for by a strong loyalty to tribal, ethnic or familial groups, matched with 
xenophobia,” Sztompka writes. This type of behavior is observable in many countries, even 
those outside of Eastern Europe. In Poland, it is possible to run across neo-Nazis or anti-Semites, 
and on occasion racially motivated crimes occur, for example, the attack on Senegalese soccer 
player Pape Samba Ba of the Odra Opole soccer team in November 2008.88                                                                                                    
 In a Newsweek Polska article about Polish aggression, the author, Zygmunt Miłoszewski, 
recounts a conversation he had at a party attended by highly educated doctors and architects. 
Apparently, even among the educated classes, anti-Semitism was present:  
There weren’t many of them who had only one Master’s degree. One of the guests 
talked about his trip to Israel, the conversation moved to the topic of the 
Palestinian conflict…suddenly someone says that we should be happy that ‘they’ 
[i.e. the Jews] are there and not here. I ask why because I miss the multicultural 
Second Republic. Another replied to that: ‘Be happier, boy, if it weren’t for 
Hitler, we would all now be the slaves of the Jews. Instead of studying, you would 
be carrying boxes in a Jewish shop.89  
 
Xenophobia has also appeared in Polish politics in recent years. Former Polish Prime 
Minister Jarosław Kaczyński of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) often appeared on the radical 
Catholic radio station Radio Maryja, which is also known for anti-Semitic and homophobic 
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sentiments. The station is unfortunately quite popular with the religious conservative electorate.90 
One of PiS’s coalition partners in 2006, The League of Polish Families (LPR), is closely 
affiliated with the racist organization MłodzieŜ Wszechpolska, which has been known to attack 
participants of tolerance marches with stones and eggs.91  A quote from PiS’s 2007 party 
program illustrates how ghettoization can leak into politics: 
In especially sensitive moments during negotiations, Poland’s position on the 
international scene was weakened with premeditation. Poland became the target of 
aggressive and unfair campaigns in some media sources abroad. We will not allow the 
weakening of Polish interests in foreign policy…we are afraid of the domination of the 
[European] Union by the strongest, most populous and most economically powerful 
countries.92 
 
 Finally, externalization emerges when people lack trust in their own society, political and 
economic institutions and products. They idealize the foreign, and take their trust elsewhere, 
usually abroad. In Poland, this is prevalent; perhaps with the exception of food, Poles do prefer 
Western products such as cars, clothing, and cosmetics. Young people often dream of a better 
life in another country, where they may idealize the standard of living or lifestyle. The “grass is 
greener” view may be intensified by the “selective bias of the media and lack of direct contrary 
evidence.”93 This leads to the decision of many Poles to take the exit option, and externalize their 
trust. 
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The Exit Option 
The “grass is greener” representation of the West often leads Poles to emigrate in search 
of better economic and educational opportunities. This indicates a significant amount of distrust 
in Poland’s economic capabilities. Numbers vary, but there are an estimated 1 to 1.2 million 
Poles in the United Kingdom alone.94 There are so many Poles living abroad that it has caused 
the unemployment rate in Poland to drop – not because of a greater availability of jobs, but 
because the workforce is smaller; people have found employment in other countries. For 
example, since Poland’s May 2004 accession to the EU, approximately 274, 000 Poles signed up 
for the National Registration Scheme in Great Britain – sixty-six percent of all applications from 
Eastern Europe.95   
On a positive note, more and more people are returning to Poland,96 especially after 
discovering that sometimes life abroad is not as ideal as they had imagined. Family matters, as 
well as the current economic crisis, are drawing more Poles back home. In a Polityka article, 
“Trzeci Start” (Third Start), Edyta Repczak from Lower Silesia tells of her return to her 
homeland. She wanted to work abroad since she was a child, and eventually ended up in France 
after finishing university. She even convinced her fiancé, who had his own business, to come 
along. He agreed, and closed the business.  
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Only once they arrived in France did they discover the harsh reality of living abroad. 
According to the article, the average monthly salary of a shopkeeper was 1,000 Euro. “And that’s 
only if you’re French,” Edyta added. She finally decided that she did not want to “degrade 
herself” by constantly looking for work, and returned to Poland after five months. She soon 
found employment in a bank with a position with promotion opportunities.97 Kuba Godlewski, 
who returned with his wife from Manchester, England, was optimistic about building a life in his 
home country. “Since we had success there [in England], why couldn’t we succeed here too?”98 
Kuba’s optimism is evidence of Poles’ increasing trust levels in their country – that there is the 
same possibility for success in Poland as in Western Europe. 
The presence of Sztompka’s characteristics as well as the exit option confirms the fact 
that Polish society is distrustful. However, that does not mean Poles cannot improve their trust 
levels. One valuable resource which can help Poles develop a more trusting society is the youth. 
People who may have been born before 1989 but were too young to have strong memories of 
Communism have a much weaker sense of self-limitation or resignation to fate, and are more 
likely to believe in the efficacy of social engagement.99 
Conclusion 
 The popular and academic discourse about distrusting Poles, of course, examines the 
subject from different viewpoints. The popular discourse seems to offer a commentary on the 
state of the society, even though that commentary can be quite negative. Not all the discourse is 
pessimistic; some journalists cite Poles’ increasing material well-being and greater appreciation 
for the positive changes brought on by the transition. The academic discourse analyzes particular 
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traits which make Poland a distrustful country, and seeks to find solutions. The popular discourse 
also uses contact with academics in writings about social trust. Interviews with sociologists, 
psychologists and citations from historians help to legitimize their claims. Data are sometimes 
misrepresented to make the trust situation seem more severe, as was the case in the Newsweek 
Polska article.  
 Tworzecki’s study of civic engagement offers insights into how trust affects politics. The 
low levels of civic and political participation are evidence that most Poles not only think it is 
futile to invest time in political activities; they also usually lack high trust for political parties, 
politicians or parliament members. Poland has lower political engagement than some of its 
neighbors – in the European Social Survey in 2004, 20% of Ukrainians participated in a lawful 
public demonstration, compared with 2% of Poles. Twenty-five percent of Slovakians, but only 
10% of Poles, signed a petition – and Slovakia’s percentage was three points higher than Ireland 
or Belgium.100 
 Sztompka’s characteristics for a distrustful society do not necessarily doom Poles to a 
fate full of misgivings and suspicion. There is no “quick fix” for corruption or providentialism, 
but Poles are already beginning to proactively transform their society from a distrusting to a 
trusting one, whether they realize it or not. Many émigrés are returning home, demonstrating 
their trust in the Polish economy and society. While it may take decades – or longer – for Poles 
to reach a trust level comparable to Germany or Great Britain, they have made much progress in 
a short span of time. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANALYSIS 
 
“Good things tend to happen in societies where people tend to trust each other – 
they have stronger democracies, richer economies, better health, and they suffer 
less often from any number of social ills…in countries where people generally 
trust one another, there are fewer worries about crime or corrupt political 
leaders.”101 
 
This chapter offers analysis of the results achieved by this study. I also compare Poland’s 
media articles on trust to those of other Eastern European countries. We find that Poland has a 
higher number of articles on social trust than all countries in the region except Ukraine and 
Russia. The online media’s interest in the trust issue may be linked to self-definition, or to 
explanations for the present state of Polish society. The results which the online media articles 
produce may also seem worse due to frequent comparisons with Western instead of Eastern 
European countries.  
Cross-National Comparison to Other Eastern European Countries 
 All of Eastern Europe, not only Poland, underwent significant political, social and 
economic changes after 1989. Therefore, we would expect to see a similar increase in distrust 
among those countries, and we may also expect to see distrust appear as a popular topic in the 
media of other Eastern European countries. The survey conducted by the Pew Research Center’s 
Global Attitudes Project on trust, crime, and corruption corroborates the argument that all former 
Communist bloc countries experienced a significant decrease in trust since 1991. However, a 
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LexisNexis database search for media articles on social trust in fifteen Eastern European 
countries and Russia102 produced some interesting results.  
 A LexisNexis database search of “social trust” and each of the Eastern European 
countries in the sample was conducted for articles published between 1 January 2002 and 31 
December 2008.103 The search produced results which support my argument that while Poland’s 
trust levels are comparable to those of other Eastern European countries, trust has become a more 
prominent issue in the media in Poland than in other countries in the region – with the exception 
of Russia and Ukraine. Table 5.1 lists the number of hits for a search of “social trust” and fifteen 
countries in Eastern Europe plus Russia. Ukraine had the highest number of hits (1000), and 
Poland and Russia followed closely with 999 hits each.  
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TABLE 5.1. Number of Hits in a LexisNexis Database Search of “Social Trust” and Fifteen Eastern European 
Countries and Russia Between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2008.  
 
COUNTRY NUMBER OF HITS 
Ukraine 1000 
Poland 999 
Russia 999 
Czech Republic 872 
Hungary 704 
Romania 665 
Serbia 493 
Montenegro 409 
Slovakia 382 
Croatia 379 
Bulgaria  369 
Belarus 334 
Albania 289 
Macedonia 290 
Slovenia 261 
Bosnia-Hercegovina 189 
 
 As the table shows, the number of hits for Poland is greater than those of other Eastern 
European countries. While this study is confined to Poland, additional research is needed to 
evaluate why trust seems to be an equally popular topic in the Ukrainian and Russian media. 
Now that we have established that trust is more of a prevalent topic in Poland than in most other 
countries in the region, let us turn to some possible explanations to why that is the case and why 
the online media seem to have very low results for social trust in Poland.   
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Searching for Identity and Self-Definition 
Poland has come a long way since the fall of Communism, and is often cited as one of the 
“success stories” of the former Eastern Bloc countries. One of Poland’s new goals is to figure out 
how best to represent herself in Europe since becoming an EU member state in 2004.  What 
characteristics or traits distinguish Poland from the rest of Europe? How do Poles want to 
interpret their tumultuous and sometimes painful past? The media may attempt, through the 
debate on social trust, to answer these questions. The articles consulted for this study not only 
discuss trust and distrust; they also examine, in detail, the nature of Polish society and what it 
means to be Polish. This suggests the media is trying to find ways to represent the society to its 
readers.  
In reconstructing Polish identity, “distrustful” is possibly one of the characteristics the 
media has chosen to highlight. In the Science study on national character and stereotypes in 
forty-nine cultures,104 the research team found that the perceptions of national character may 
serve as a way to maintain a national identity. Perhaps this is why there are so many articles 
discussing Polish character traits, low trust levels, and social problems such as anger, aggression, 
and cynicism. While these articles can be very critical, perhaps it is a necessary process for 
discerning which characteristics are distinctively Polish.  
These “distinctively Polish” characteristics are often contradictory. “Looking in the 
mirror…a Pole sees a socialist liberal, a permissive Catholic, an autocratic democrat, an anarchic 
pro-governmentalist. Those double identities disturb him…He would like to know with what and 
as whom he will enter Europe. But somehow he cannot decide, because he is not even able to 
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understand himself.”105 This was how Poles were characterized in a Polityka article which 
scrutinized various national characteristics. The same article describes what happens to Poles on 
the European arena. “The Pole enters Europe. With Polish fears, complexes and pride…his 
[inferiority] complex upholds the fact that he cannot manage in competition with the West.” It 
goes on to make the statement, “There are few people in the world so distrusting as Poles.”106   
Distrust as a Cause for the Present State of Polish Society 
 The media may also attempt to use lack of trust to explain the present state of Polish 
society. In a Wprost article entitled “The Republic of the Distrusting,” distrust is used to explain 
everything from dangerously low social capital to poor interpersonal relations. “Everything bad 
that we can say about the Third Republic has its roots in us,” the author, Janusz Czapiński, 
writes. “Poor functioning of institutions, as well as inefficient government 
investments…corruption, group conflict and ‘impossibilism’ which is already famous, results 
from the citizen’s jealousy and distrust.”107 This author clearly shifts the responsibility to the 
citizen, instead of the government, courts or other institutions of authority. In another article in 
Wprost, “The Seven Major Polish Sins,” distrust is in second place. In that article, Rafał 
Ziemkiewicz states that common trust is a major component of progress, but unfortunately, “the 
average Pole keeps in his soul the deep distrust of a serf.”108 
Is it solely the responsibility of the citizen to become more trusting, or do the 
government, courts and economic institutions also play a role? Is the distrusting citizen the 
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largest barrier to Polish progress? After all, in Scandinavian countries, social trust is high – and 
there is less corruption and crime, and greater community spirit. These are the goals to which 
Poland aspires. But is it constructive for the media to compare Poland with more successful, 
richer nations? As we will see in the next section, comparisons with Western European countries 
make for lower perceived trust levels, which do not help the citizen to become more trusting. 
Comparisons with Western Countries Lead to Lower Perceived Trust Levels in Poland 
 The online articles consulted for this study often suggest grim results for Poland 
regarding social trust. However, in examining the articles, I found that the reason for this is not 
the actual level of social trust in Poland; rather, it is the standard against which Poland is being 
compared. In the majority of cases, Poland is compared with Western Europe, not Eastern 
Europe. Therefore, the trust levels seem to be much lower than in reality. If the authors of the 
various articles compared Poland to Russia, Ukraine, or even Italy, they would find the trust 
levels to be normal or higher than they represent in their work. Instead, many articles compare 
Poland with Sweden, the Netherlands, or Ireland – some of the most trusting countries in Europe. 
In that case, it is not surprising that Poles seem to be extremely distrusting. 
When compared with Ireland, it appears that Poland does not stand a chance. “The state 
of our society [regarding trust] proves that the road which Poland is taking is leading us in the 
direction of Greece, rather than Ireland, which is an ideal case.”109 Poles supposedly have the 
lowest level of general trust out of all citizens of EU countries. However, when we examine the 
article which makes this claim, we see which countries are compared with Poland.110 Sweden 
takes first place as the most trusting country, followed by the Netherlands and Ireland. 
                                                          
109
 Czapiński, Janusz (2008). “Rzeczpospolita nieufnych.” Wprost, number 12/2008 (1317), 
http://www.wprost.pl/ar/125760/Rzeczpospolita-nieufnych/, accessed 21 November 2008. 
 
110
 Ibid. See the graph on the first page of this article for details. 
 
53 
 
Switzerland is the fourth most trusting country – although it is not in the EU. Several Western 
European countries follow. Only three Eastern European countries are mentioned in the 
comparison, and naturally, Poland is in last place. Interestingly, certain EU member states are 
absent from the comparison in the article, namely the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania. If 
these countries had been added, it may have changed Poland’s ranking.  
Conclusion 
 In this analysis, we have seen how Poland differs from most countries in Eastern Europe 
when it comes to media coverage of trust in society. All of Eastern Europe and Russia underwent 
political and economic transition; low trust levels are prevalent in all cases. However, Poland is 
one of the few countries where social trust is such a prominent topic in the online media.  
 As a relatively new EU member, it is important for Poles to find their niche in the larger 
European community. While each person does this in his or her own way, the online media may 
resort to constant debate about which characteristics are Polish, what is favorable or unfavorable 
about these traits, or even criticism of the society as a whole. During the course of Polish history, 
Polish identity has been overshadowed by the culture of the partitioning, and later, occupying 
powers; the Soviet Union certainly had influence over the Poles during the Communist years. 
What cultural heritage and identity can Poland bring to the European table? Hopefully, as trust 
levels increase, Poles’ view of themselves will also improve, enabling them to further integrate 
into Europe. 
 Explanations for the state of Polish society are abundant, and include corrupt politicians, 
the  incorrect implementation of democracy, Communism, and a traumatic history. However, in 
many online press writings, a different approach is taken. Some journalists are pointing to the 
Polish people themselves as the main culprit for inadequate politics, a slow economy, and lack of 
54 
 
community. They say that in every successful democracy, there is a high level of social capital. 
One of the key ingredients for social capital is mutual trust. Without mutual trust, a democracy 
will become weak. Is the prevalence of the trust issue in the online media merely a “wake up 
call” for citizens, showing that it is time to be proactive and repair the chronic lack of trust in 
Polish society? Although levels of mutual trust is rising, many Poles still do not trust the 
government, parliament, or especially political parties. People who hold positions of public trust, 
such as doctors, lawyers, or mayors, are still looked upon with suspicion. Consistent effort will 
be required to overcome these barriers. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
“For me, a penchant for risk and constant, creative activity are an inherent 
matter of a full life. Of course, I could be mistaken. I must have trust, because if 
I didn’t have trust, I would close myself off in isolation...I find sense in life in 
being a better person than I was yesterday... That is my life strategy and my life 
has turned out well.” 111 
  
Trust is a fundamental part of human life without which societies could not function. If 
members of an entire society lack trust, it not only has implications for each individual in that 
society, but for the wider world as well. In post-Communist Poland, low levels of trust have 
contributed to mutual suspicion, lack of confidence in ruling bodies, and apathy for political 
participation. If social trust decreases, that could affect other sectors of society, including civil 
society, which would have negative effects on the functioning of democracy. 
This study has explored the distrust paradox – the disconnect between the Polish online 
media’s claims that Poland is an extremely distrustful society and the cross-national data which 
indicate that Poland is “in the middle of the pack” when it comes to trust in comparison to other 
Eastern and with some Western European countries, notably Italy and Portugal. Public opinion 
surveys corroborate the cross-national data findings and indicate that Polish society is steadily 
becoming more trusting.  
Poles may point to several historical reasons to explain why they feel that they lack trust. 
In many instances, fear of Russia or Germany is based on prior conflicts with those countries. 
For example, in the midst of the 2008 Russia-Georgia crisis and the missile defense shield 
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debate, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski pointed not only to Poles’ long-standing fear 
of Russia, but also past experience of abandonment by Poland’s allies.112 However, not all 
historical accounts portray Poles as the innocent victims of brutal oppressors. The controversy 
surrounding the treatment of Jews during the Second World War is linked to issues of exclusion 
and inclusion; that is, who is considered to be Polish and who is not. This raises the question of 
whether it is possible to trust someone who is not a member of the group, and to what extent 
Polish Jews could trust their Polish Catholic neighbors.  
By Western standards, Poles – and other Eastern European populations – exhibit a low 
level of trust. Therefore, we would expect trust to be an equally popular topic in the media of 
other transitioning countries – but we do not. Distrust has almost become an obsession in the 
Polish online media, yet other online sources in other countries in the region do not seem to view 
trust as a major societal problem. I have suggested two possible explanations for why the Polish 
press seems to concentrate on the lack of trust in their society. The media may be trying to find 
ways to represent the society to its readers, or using distrust as a source of blame for the state of 
Polish society. Of course, one cannot dismiss the possibility that perhaps online articles about 
rampant distrust might receive a larger number of hits than articles about other topics. 
The media sometimes cites or interviews psychologists and sociologists in online articles 
in order to make them more credible. Academics generally refrain from making strong claims 
about low levels of trust in society, and also suggest concrete ways to revive social trust in their 
work on Polish society and political life.113 They also seek to explain the lack of trust using a 
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variety of factors (legacy of distrusting authorities, economics, and history), and do not castigate 
society. The popular discourse, in contrast, only restates the problem and fails to offer any 
solutions. It is also quite critical of most Poles and highlights more negative than positive aspects 
of Polish life. 
While there are strategies for improving trust levels, there must be incentives for Polish 
society to become more trusting.114 One of the largest incentives has been EU integration. Not 
only does belonging to the EU encourage economic growth and opportunities for employment 
and travel, it also includes Poland in a club of European states which are all dependent on each 
other. To some extent, this forces Poles to trust the Western European members of the group to 
include Poland in the decision-making process and to treat them as members of the West. This 
also means that Poles and citizens of other transitioning countries have to work to gain the trust 
of the West. How long this process will take is open to debate. 
Expansion of the Study for Future Research 
 The analysis of trust levels and the media’s representation of social trust in Poland is a 
starting point for further comparative research. Indeed, there are numerous possibilities for future 
studies. Russia and Ukraine would be appropriate points of comparison since trust is a popular 
topic in those countries as well. In such a study, the researcher could introduce several questions: 
What is the media discourse in Russia and Ukraine about the trust levels of their citizens? Do 
public opinion surveys in those countries corroborate the media’s claims? What are the trends in 
the cross-national and media analysis data? Do Russians and Ukrainians also point to history as a 
reason as to why they do not trust? If so, in what context?  
As a former Soviet Socialist Republic, it would be interesting to see if Ukrainians 
demonstrate a similar fear and distrust of Russia. One could also analyze Ukrainians’ trust of 
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Poles, given past conflicts between the two groups.115 In Russia, where half of respondents in the 
Pew Research survey reported that most people in society are trustworthy,116 we also see a 
disconnect between the data and the media. A LexisNexis database search produced an equal 
amount of articles about social trust in Russia and Poland.    
In a wider European context, academics focusing primarily on Western Europe can use 
this study’s results for Poland in a comparison with Italy and Portugal, two Western European 
countries which also exhibit relatively low social trust.117 The differing histories of each nation 
would most likely provide dissimilar source of social distrust. Since the predominant religion of 
all three countries is Roman Catholicism, a religious studies angle may also produce intriguing 
results.   
A comparison between Poland and Ireland would also be in order. Ireland, like Poland, is 
a Roman Catholic country whose inhabitants regularly practice their religion and place a strong 
emphasis on family values. Ireland also has the legacy of English domination. It would be 
intriguing to discover if the Irish relate to the English in the same way the Poles relate to the 
Russians, and how that may affect the Ireland’s trust toward England. In addition, there is 
currently a large Polish community in Ireland, so the researcher could also explore Irish trust not 
only toward England, but also toward Polish immigrants. 
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Implications for the European Union and Transitioning Countries 
 While this study is confined to Poland, issues of trust and distrust ultimately have more 
far-reaching consequences. Mutual trust is necessary in effective cooperation between Western 
and Eastern Europe. Integration into Europe is not solely the responsibility of the transitioning 
countries. In order for EU countries of Eastern Europe to truly feel they are EU members, 
collaboration and trust are needed on both sides. Western European countries will also have to 
change how they view their neighbors to the East and show willingness to trust them.118 The 
West has to trust the East to follow guidelines for EU membership and Euro adoption.  However, 
Eastern Europeans must also work hard to gain the trust of the West through responsible 
application of EU policy (and responsible appropriation of EU funds), successful ability to 
follow the organization’s laws, and even by the behavior of individual citizens. 
Implications for Poland 
The situation facing Poles at this point is one of choice. Will Poles choose, individually 
and collectively, which characteristics they want to embrace as their own, how they will 
reconcile with their past, and what they want to do with the freedoms they have regained? Rising 
living standards and a more satisfied population have resulted in increasing trust levels; 
nevertheless, Poles will face a decision of who they want to trust, and when. Politicians and 
political parties must still work hard to earn the public’s trust; only time will tell if they succeed 
in doing so. There is also the individual decision to stay in Poland or emigrate, and, once abroad, 
whether to remain there or return home. This also has implications of its own. The current 
economic crisis has perhaps caused many to reflect on the positive and negative consequences of 
global interdependence.  
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I have previously argued that the discussion in the online media is part of a larger 
process, necessary to reconstruct Polish identity in an effort to figure out what position Poland is 
to assume in a larger European context. The choices are numerous: Poland as the leader of the 
new Eastern European democracies or as a nation previously oppressed by its more powerful 
neighbors; Poland as the descendant of a rich, thousand-year history or as a country barely able 
to compete with the West. Simply put, it is necessary to decide, both individually and 
collectively, whether Poles want to be victims or survivors, and whether they want to be in 
competition or collaboration with Europe. 
The debate in the media and among Poles themselves is important not only to establish 
Poland’s place in Europe, but to come to terms with a painful and complex past. Considerable 
discussion and reconciliation is needed to overcome, for example, the crimes at Jedwabne, or 
Nazi and Soviet occupation. Remaining in the past will do nothing but hinder further EU 
integration and cooperation with other countries.  
Implications for Polish Journalists and Media 
 Journalists and the media play a prominent role in selecting information which is 
available to the public. Information can be controlled by the manipulation or omission of data, 
creating a false image of the issues at hand. One of the key elements of the distrust paradox in 
the Polish case is the presentation of information which appears to be believable, since it is 
sometimes “corroborated” by surveys and data. Upon further investigation, I discovered that the 
exact source of the information was often not referenced, or that the data cited did not support 
the journalist’s main argument. The journalists may choose to only include that information 
which advances the “rampant distrust” argument, and ignore evidence which shows otherwise. In 
many of the articles consulted for this thesis, the accuracy of the data presented is questionable. 
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The distrust paradox in the media and cross-national data has its roots in the type of information 
journalists choose to present to their audience.  
  It is open to debate whether the online media checks its facts or not. The absence of 
statistics, properly scaled graphs, or the incorrect representation of data leads the researcher to 
believe that the media allows articles to be released which accomplish their goal – highlighting 
rampant distrust in Polish society. The contradictions and false claims which appear in some 
trust-related articles in this study seem to affirm that there is little proofreading or fact checking. 
For example, in a Wprost article from December 2008, “The Republic of the Distrusting,” a bar 
graph depicting the average earnings, trust and education levels of citizens of seventeen 
European countries lacks a scale for measurement. In all three categories, Poland is in last place, 
but the absence of a scale complicates the ability for analysis. (One may also wonder which 
common scale could be used to measure salary, trust and education levels.) The source for the 
data is cited as “European Social Survey,” but does not provide the year in which the survey was 
conducted. The most recent European Social Survey which asked trust-related questions took 
place in 2006. In addition, the graph only provides data for seventeen countries, yet the most 
recent European Social Survey included data for twenty-five countries. 119 Russia and Ukraine, 
which exhibited slightly lower trust levels than Poland in the survey, were omitted in the graph 
in the Wprost article.120 
 This example demonstrates how information can be skewed, changed or omitted to 
contribute to the discourse on distrusting Poles in the online media. Journalists and editors of the 
online media may assume that readers will not check the facts or further explore the references, 
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and will just accept what is written in the articles. However, if public awareness of rising trust 
levels increases while the distrust topic remains popular in the media, readers may begin to 
notice the disconnect between reality and the media discourse. If that were to happen, distrust 
may be redirected toward the media and journalists for perpetuating incorrect information. 
Lending a Helping Hand 
 The observations, experiences and people I encountered while living in Poland were the 
inspiration for this study. None of that would have been possible, however, without the 
assistance of one very trusting Pole and her family. When I returned to the United States from a 
semester in Poland, I became acquainted with a Polish woman named Magda during the flight. 
She spoke little English and had never traveled outside Europe. I helped her through passport and 
customs control. She introduced me to friends who were hosting her during her visit. I had many 
opportunities to visit them during Magda’s six-month stay in the United States, and Magda and I 
became friends. It was an unusual friendship; not only were we from different cultural traditions 
and backgrounds, but we were also generations apart. 
 At the time, I was having difficulty with my plans to teach English in Poland. Magda 
called various schools and helped me fill out applications. She also volunteered to look for a job 
for me near her hometown in Northeastern Poland. Within three weeks of her return, Magda 
notified me that she had contacted an English school, and the director was very interested in 
hiring a native English speaker. Before I knew it, I had a job and was on the plane to Poland. 
The extent to which Magda and her family trusted me was evident from the start. Magda 
invited me into her home, even leaving me to look after the house while she was at work. Her 
eldest son allowed me to borrow his car and helped me to find an apartment. The fact that they 
would place so much trust in a foreigner was surprising, especially considering the private-
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versus-public dynamic which is common in transitioning Eastern European cultures. Indeed, the 
willingness to invite a non-Pole into the private world of the family is indicative of the fact that 
Poles are not the most distrustful people in Europe as the media claims. It is also unlikely that I 
would receive such invitations or assistance from strangers in other European countries, even 
those countries which statistically show more trusting populations. 
Concluding Remarks 
Consumers of online articles about rampant distrust in Polish society need not panic – 
Poland does not have the most distrusting society in Europe. While trust levels in the country are 
relatively low, they are comparable to other Eastern European and some Western European 
countries. Yet, we do not see trust as such a popular topic in the media of other nations in the 
region. This tells us that one of the few exceptional aspects of Polish distrust is how frequently 
the media writes about it.  
 It would be interesting to discover how many people are actually reading the media’s 
articles highlighting negative aspects about Polish society and how they react to the journalists’ 
claims. My Polish acquaintances were annoyed at the overly critical nature of the articles I 
mentioned during conversations about my research. “They [journalists] should write more about 
how we can improve our country, not complain about what is wrong with it. They are just 
making the problem worse,” they said.121 Perhaps they are right. There must be a way for the 
media to bring the distrust issue to the public’s attention while also releasing articles about the 
progress Poland has made.  
  The current economic downturn makes it difficult to predict how Poland’s economy will 
handle the recession, but the return of many Poles from abroad should have some positive 
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impacts in the future. Other choices will influence Poland’s complex past and her relations with 
surrounding countries. Will Poles be able to achieve a balance between remembering their 
history, and not being limited by it? Will Poles’ mutual trust levels continue to rise, leading to a 
happier society and thus a brighter future? Zobaczymy – we will see.  
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APPENDIX A 
DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLE COLLECTION 
 
Results for keyword search “social trust” in six online magazines and newspapers, including 
websites and blogs, from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2008. 
 
Magazine or 
Newspaper 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Gazeta 
Wyborcza 
_ 4 1 1 _ 2 8 16 
Newsweek 
Polska 
_ _ _ _ 1 _ 1 2 
Wprost 2 _ 1 6 1 _ 6 16 
Polityka _ _ 2 6 3 6 18 35 
Nowy Dziennik _ _ _ _ _ 1 _ 1 
Pomorski 
Przegląd 
Gospodarczy 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 1 1 
Websites/Blogs _ _ _ _ _ 2 3 5 
Total 2 4 4 13 5 11 37 76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
APPENDIX B 
STRATEGIES AND OBSTACLES FOR IMPROVING TRUST LEVELS 
 
The Polish media does not seem to offer any solutions for the lack of trust in Polish 
society. However, academic discourse suggests several strategies and obstacles concerning the 
gradual improvement of trust in Polish society. The increase in life satisfaction, EU integration, 
and effort on the part of political elites are all necessary to regain not only mutual trust, but also 
trust in authority and politicians on the national level. While some of these solutions are 
presently occurring in Poland, others will require considerable effort and cooperation. 
EU Integration and Close Ties with Western Democracies  
One very important factor in curing the distrust syndrome is close integration with 
Western democracies.122 This is crucial since Eastern European countries in transition need 
assistance from countries which have experience in democracy and capitalism. Poland joined the 
EU in 2004, and it has helped a great deal in speeding up the country’s integration into Europe. 
EU membership, and the Western integration it represents, gives Poles the feeling that they are 
part of something larger than themselves: a multi-country organization with presence on the 
world stage. The rotation of power between the various EU countries lessens the fear of any one 
country becoming dominant.  
The EU has produced beneficial outcomes, as Poland is one of the most EU-friendly 
states in the organization, and most Poles feel that being under the “umbrella” of the EU 
provides them with protection, opportunities to improve the country and economic stability. 
Sixty-five percent of Poles support the EU, and over 70% think EU membership has benefited 
                                                          
122
 Sztompka, Piotr (1996). “Trust and Emerging Democracy: Lessons from Poland.” International Sociology 11 :1, 
59.  
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their country.123 In addition, EU funds have improved roads, education and business 
opportunities. In 2006, I was able to participate in an English training project for local 
businessmen in Olsztyn, thanks to EU funding. Rigid EU standards force various sectors of 
society – from farmers and banks to the police and the school system – to change the rules and 
align them with those of the EU (the West). Belonging to the West provides a large incentive to 
improve political, economic, professional and educational life. Ultimately, this leads to a more 
amicable living environment, providing a basis for increasing trust levels.  
Increase in Life Satisfaction  
Improvement in the quality of life is necessary to increase trust within a society. The 
European countries with the highest trust levels coincidentally also show the highest levels of life 
satisfaction.124 Fortunately, Poles’ life satisfaction has also been increasing in the past few years 
which correspond to increasing trust levels. The Eurobarometer 70 report, released in January 
2009, indicates that the number of Poles satisfied with their lives (76%) is identical to the EU 
average.  According to a recent CBOS poll, life satisfaction has been steadily improving in 
Poland since 1994. In that year, slightly over 40% of respondents stated they were rather 
satisfied with their lives, and 11% said they were very satisfied. In 2008, life satisfaction jumped 
to 70% - and the number of Poles who were very satisfied almost doubled, reaching 20%.125 For 
2008, the CBOS reports the highest levels of overall life satisfaction in Poland since 1994. 
                                                          
123
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 Wciórka, Bogna. CBOS opinion poll (January 2009). Polacy o swoim zadowoleniu z Ŝycia. Opinie z lat 1994-
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Interestingly, out of the many solutions Sztompka envisioned to raise trust levels,126 material 
gain was not one of them – yet it seems to be an important factor in why Poles say they are 
happier with their lives. 
Equality Before the Law  
This not only restores trust in the government, but in the legal system as well. All 
citizens, regardless of status, must be equal before the law and be responsible for their own 
actions. The constitution should clearly outline laws and the structure of political, social and 
legal institutions, and not allow arbitrariness or possibilities to stretch the law. Unfortunately, 
there is still much work to be done in this area, not only in Poland, but in other post-Communist 
countries as well. Most importantly, the laws must be enforced. This also must be clearly 
outlined in some legal code. Citizens’ responsibilities should not allow for exceptions, and 
criminals should be punished. One positive indication that those in power are not above the law 
was the 2008 arrest and incarceration of former Olsztyn mayor Czesław Jerzy Małkowski. 
Protection of Private Property  
Citizens must feel safe in order for social trust to increase. Sztompka places a high degree 
of importance on ensuring the protection of private property.127 During Communism, the state 
owned everything. Now that Poland is progressing, it is important to assure citizens of their right 
to their own property. Most Poles (85%) feel safe in their place of residence, and the more often 
they come in contact with various legal institutions (e.g. police, courts or notaries), the more 
satisfied they are with their services.128 
                                                          
126
 Sztompka, Piotr (1996). “Trust and Emerging Democracy: Lessons from Poland.” International Sociology 11 :1, 
57-60. 
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 Kojder, Andrzej. CBOS opinion poll (March 2008). “Kontakty z prawem, ocena institucji prawnych i poczucie 
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In addition, the government needs to restore trust in local currency. During communism, 
people often used dollars, pounds or German marks because they had more purchasing power. 
Today, some Poles who immigrate to Western countries and return to Poland exchange pounds, 
Euros or dollars to złotys to make large purchases (or they buy some items abroad because they 
are cheaper there than in Poland). We can only speculate as to whether trust in the currency will 
increase when Poland adopts the Euro. The Polish economy is weak due to the global economic 
slowdown, and the złoty has lost 19% of its value against the Euro since January of this year. It 
was presumed that Poland would enter the two-year fixed exchange rate program necessary to 
adopt the Euro in 2010 or 2011, but Polish economists are now saying that the program may be 
too risky to enter this year. Despite this, the Polish government still hopes for Euro adoption by 
2012, although most economists say Poland will be ready by 2013 at the earliest.129 
Watchdog Organizations  
The government should be open to the public and more transparent. The media plays an 
important role in this. Independent media sources, privately owned newspapers and non-
governmental data collection organizations should all collaborate to provide accurate information 
about the actions of the government. Simply put, information about the government should be 
shown to the public from outside, not inside, sources. “Watchdog” organizations, especially from 
other countries or international units should monitor reform, and constant monitoring and 
analyzing of public moods should become commonplace. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitor elections in Poland, publish reports, and analyze election 
effectiveness. 
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While many political events still go on behind closed doors, public opinion polling has 
increased dramatically in Poland since the 1990s. A large deal of sources for this thesis, in fact, 
comes from the Polish Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS). Survey results are helpful, 
according to Piotr Sztompka, because they help citizens become aware of each others’ feelings, 
and eliminates what he calls “pluralistic ignorance.”130  
Pluralism  
A variety of choices, from politics to consumer products and cultural life, provides 
diversity of experiences. Consumer choices should include local and foreign-made products. 
Today, there are a variety of products available for purchase, both domestically and 
internationally produced. Embracing any ethnic or religious minorities, such as Ukrainians, 
Germans or Belarusians, lessens the fear of the unknown. While Poland is a quite homogeneous 
society, some ethnic minorities continue to preserve their culture and pass it on to the next 
generation in the form of cultural clubs, church groups, and festivals. Unfortunately, other 
groups, like the Roma, remain marginalized. There are a variety of political parties in Poland, 
although there is not much difference between the platforms of most of them. Slightly over half 
of Poles (54%) do not trust political parties, and 32% do not trust the government.131 One 
significant reason for this is the Communist legacy. Perhaps with time, the government and the 
citizens’ disposition toward it will improve.  
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People with “Special Access” to the System Should Try to Gain Public Trust  
Trust should be restored in those with special “access” to the system, such as doctors, 
lawyers, government clerks, mayors and politicians.132 People in these positions should take 
special care to be willing to help the public, and exhibit honesty, sincerity and concern instead of 
indifference or dishonesty. There should be constant evaluation of government employees and 
courses on how to improve workplace conditions and conduct. The hiring process for positions 
of “high social visibility” (such as political office) should be rigorous and highly selective.133 As 
we have seen in previous sections, this is unfortunately still not the case in Poland, where a 
former leader of a racist-nationalist youth organization (Roman Giertych, Education Minister), a 
pig farmer (Andrzej Lepper) and twin brothers (Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński) have all held, or 
continue to hold, high positions in the government.  
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